University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 31

Number 3

Article 5

5-1-2006

Determining Better Standards for Firm Resettlement, Judicial
Discretion, and Immigration Administrative Practice
Matthew J. Fery
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Fery, Matthew J. (2006) "Determining Better Standards for Firm Resettlement, Judicial Discretion, and
Immigration Administrative Practice," University of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 31: No. 3, Article 5.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol31/iss3/5

This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

DETERMINING BETTER STANDARDS FOR FIRM
RESETTLEMENT, JUDICIAL DISCRETION, AND
IMMIGRATION ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
DIALLO V. ASHCROFT, 381 F.3D 687
(7TH CIR. 2004).
Matthew J. Fery*
I.

INTRODUCTION

People from around the world desire to immigrate to the United
States because of the promise of political freedom and economic
opportunity. Conventional immigration, however, is a bureaucratic process,
placing limits on the number of immigrants accepted. It often takes years
for prospective immigrants to obtain the proper paperwork and
documentation to legally enter the United States.1 The process is
particularly problematic for refugees, who, due to the immediacy of political
persecution in their home countries, require expedited entry procedures to
avoid further persecution.2 The United Nations Convention Against Torture
and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(“CAT”) provides relief to refugees, authorizing treaty signatories to enact
expedited methods for refugees of political persecution to be granted
asylum.3 Asylum relief is what Mamadou Diallo, a Mauritanian national,
sought and what the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was
interested in granting in Diallo’s case.4
Diallo and petitioners like him are subject to administrative
procedures that are riddled with substantive and procedural difficulties. For
example, judges wrestle with the amount of discretion they can assert over
decisions of administrative law judges, how much weight to give external

_______________________________________________________
* Matthew J. Fery is a Third-Year Law Student at the University of Dayton School Law. He received a
B.A. in Economics and Diplomacy & Foreign Affairs from Miami University in 2003. He is a Research
Assistant at the Charles F. Kettering Foundation in Centerville, Ohio.
1
And with the primacy of globalization, where the borders of the world have figuratively shrunk due to
technological advances and economic liberalization, the velocity of people moving from country to
country has, and undoubtedly will, increase, leading to even longer waits to enter the United States
through conventional immigration and asylum. See Kevin R. Johnson, Symposium: Law and the Border,
Open Borders? 51 UCLA L. Rev. 193, 263 (Oct. 2003).
2
Approximately 400,000 refugees who have been physically abused or tortured in their home countries
now live in the United States. Encarnacion Pyle, Refugees Face Different Pain; Grant to Help Victims of
Torture Disappears, Columbus Dispatch 1A (Nov. 27, 2004).
3
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) prt. I, art. 3 (Feb. 4, 1985) Intl. Human Rights Instruments T.S. No.
221.1[hereinafter CAT].
4
Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 701 (7th Cir. 2004).
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sources when assessing the credibility of a petitioner’s testimony, and
establishing precedent when reviewing administrative procedures relating to
asylum claims. The role of circuit court judges is difficult because circuit
court decisions can help guide administrative procedures. Therefore, it is
imperative for circuit court judges to establish helpful and comprehensive
standards that administrative law judges can use in their consideration of
whether a petition for asylum can be granted or not.
In Diallo v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not
establish helpful and comprehensive standards upon which administrative
law judges could reasonably rely and enforce. In fact, the broad and vague
firm resettlement standard established by the court, allowing Diallo asylum
in the United States, may be improper because it fails to provide any
instruction to administrative law judges on how to treat future cases like
Diallo’s. Therefore, this note seeks to explore how the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals could have instructed administrative law judges on how to
deal with asylum cases like Diallo’s in a more effective and comprehensive
way.
The background section of this note will tell Diallo’s story,
beginning from a small town in Mauritania all the way to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. The argument section will critically analyze the
standard established by the Seventh Circuit on the issue of firm resettlement,
arguing that the standard is unnecessarily broad and vague. The section will
argue that the Seventh Circuit should have adopted a test akin to the Third
Circuit’s test in Abdille and should have remanded Diallo’s case for further
proceedings on the issue of Diallo’s possible resettlement in Senegal. The
Seventh Circuit did properly remand for review the issues of whether Diallo
had experienced past persecution and had a legitimate fear of future
persecution if removed to Mauritania. Nonetheless, the court gave
insufficient guidance to the immigration judge on remand as to what sources
can be considered in determining whether conditions in Mauritania had
changed to the extent that Diallo’s claims could be rebutted. Furthermore,
by remanding Diallo’s case to the immigration judge, the court was
implicitly acknowledging that a violation of Diallo’s due process rights
occurred when the asylum officer found that he failed to appear at the initial
immigration interview. The conclusion section will provide a summation of
the substantive arguments and give a general reflection on the important role
circuit court judges play within the context of asylum and immigration law
in general.
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BACKGROUND

The Story of Mamadou Diallo: How He Got to the United
States

Diallo’s claim arose on an application for political asylum, a
common form of relief sought by immigrants seeking to flee persecution
from their home governments and live peacefully within the borders of the
United States.5 The process of either receiving or being denied asylum is an
administrative process. Immigration law judges, acting as administrative
law judges, are warranted considerable deference towards their decisions by
reviewing appellate courts.6 Asylum hearings are a particularly unique type
of administrative procedure because they have a foundation in international
treaties, and generally exist as highly interesting and intriguing stories of
human toil and struggle.7
Mamadou Diallo was born in Foundu, a town in the country of
Mauritania, on August 20, 1958.8 Mauritania is a state in west Africa9 that
has a considerably large and barren terrain.10 Mauritania has a population of
2.8 million and the Mauritanian government is largely an Islamic republic
with a strong presidency.11 Until 1960, Mauritania was a colony of
France.12
Considerable social, economic, and political strife has existed in
Mauritania since becoming an independent state.13 Mauritania is largely
divided between a “white” or “beydanes” Moor ruling class and a “black”
Moor underclass.14 The black Moor population has suffered since
independence, largely because of increased desertification (natural
expansion of the Sahara Desert)15 and political, economic, and social

_______________________________________________________
5

8 C.F.R. § 208.1 et seq. (2005).
Decisions of administrative law judges, when subject to judicial review by appellate courts, are weighed
against a substantial evidence standard, whether the substantial evidence supports the administrative law
judge’s decision. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natl. Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
7
See CAT, supra n. 3.
8
Pets. Br. at 3, Diallo v. Ashcroft, 2003 WL 23339882 (7th Cir. Apr. 8, 2003); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 690.
9
Mauritania is located on the Atlantic Ocean coast in western Africa at the southwestern end of the vast
Sahara Desert. National Geographic Society (U.S.), Atlas of the World, 86 (8th ed., Natl. Geographic
Socy. 2004). The country lies immediately north of the Senegal River and the country of Senegal. Id.
10
While Mauritania is larger in surface area than the states of Texas and New Mexico combined,
approximately eighty percent of its land consists merely of barren desert. Background Note: Mauritania,
U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of African Affairs 1 (Mar. 2005).
11
Id.; see also Mauritania Country Report on Human Rights Practices, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Lab. 1 (Feb. 25, 2004).
12
Atlas of the World, at 129.
13
Id.
14
Background Note: Mauritania, supra n. 10, at 2.
15
Atlas of the World, at 129; Pet.’s Br. 4 (Apr. 8, 2003).
6
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oppression by the white Moor leadership.16 Discrimination exists at all
levels of Mauritanian society and has gradually intensified over the years.17
Mamadou Diallo and his family, all black Moors, were presumably
at the receiving end of this discrimination.18 Both Mamadou Diallo and his
younger brother, Saidou Diallo, were members of the principal Mauritanian
armed opposition movement to the beydanes leadership, the African
Liberation Forces of Mauritania, or FLAM.19 FLAM was founded in 1983
from a coalition of 4 political groups20 all seeking to end racial
discrimination in Mauritania.21 The founding members sought to promote a
non-violent discussion about political oppression so that all Mauritanians,
especially the disengaged and disenfranchised black Moor population,
would have a legitimate stake in the country’s future.22
In 1989 or 1990, Saidou Diallo, who was a leader of FLAM, was
arrested by Mauritanian officials, imprisoned for six months, tortured and
eventually killed.23 Saidou’s tragic death came at a time when the
Mauritanian government was undertaking widespread arrests to thwart
political instability and generally cleanse Mauritanian society from
outspoken black Moor leadership.24
Mamadou Diallo was not affected by the government persecution
until approximately May 1993.25 At that time, Diallo was arrested by
Mauritanian officials and sent to jail without having the opportunity for a
trial or to speak to an attorney.26 Diallo remained in jail for 6 months.27 In
prison, he was subject to “hard labor” practices and experienced abuse from
a prison guard when his arm was slashed for working too slowly.28
Upon his release, Diallo’s Mauritanian captors sent him on a boat to
Senegal, with nothing but an identification card indicating his Mauritanian

_______________________________________________________
16
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1990 – Mauritania, http://www.hrw.org/
reports/1990/WR90/AFRICA.BOU-06.htm#P339_74389 (accessed Mar. 20, 2006) [hereinafter World
Report 1990].
17
Id.
18
Pet.’s Br. 4.
19
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 690.
20
The four groups were “Movement des Eleves Noir, L’Organization Pour la Defence des Interets des
Negro-Africans de Mauritanie or LODINAM, Organization Popular des Africans de Mauritanie, and
Lignee Democratique de Mauritanie.” Bill Weinberg, Mauritania: Slavery, Ethnic Cleansing,
Democratic Opposition; Voices of the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (FLAM),
http://www.ww4report.com/ node/1022 (accessed Mar. 20, 2006).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 690.
24
World Report 1990, supra n. 16, at 4.
25
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 691.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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nationality.29 Senegal lies immediately south of the inhabitable areas of
Mauritania.30 Diallo’s forced expulsion to Senegal was not a unique
experience among black Mauritanians at that time.31 The governments of
Mauritania and Senegal, as early as 1989, began a process of “Arabization,”
whereby the Mauritanian government would deport black citizens to
Senegal.32 The deportations continued in various forms.33 By 1992, there
was an estimated 50,000 Mauritanian refugees in Senegal.34
Diallo remained in Senegal for approximately 4 years.35 To provide
some sort of lifestyle, Diallo began selling small things.36 Diallo lived in an
apartment with a former acquaintance, went to church, and even made a trip
to the capital city of Senegal.37 Since Diallo was not living in a refugee
camp, he did not seek asylum from Senegalese officials; nor was any offer
of asylum ever proposed to him by those officials.38 And even though he
had no legal right to live in Senegal, Diallo was never bothered by
Senegalese immigration officers.39
B.

Moving Through the Administrative Process: Diallo’s
Claim before the Immigration Judge and the Bureau of
Immigration Appeals

On June 3, 1997, Diallo arrived in the United States at Baltimore
after stowing away on a ship bound from Senegal.40 Approximately two
months later, Diallo submitted INS Form I-589 seeking asylum refugee
status with the United States government, and the application was received
by the government on August 12, 1997.41 However, Diallo’s interpreter
failed to appear at his asylum interview with immigration officials, making
Diallo unable to participate in the interview, constituting a failure to
appear.42 Federal regulations stipulate that if an asylum applicant fails to

_______________________________________________________
29

Id.
Atlas of the World at 86.
31
World Report 1990, supra n. 16, at 1.
32
Id.
33
Id. While concerted deportations occurred primarily in 1989-1990, deportations continued well after
that, as the Diallo case suggests.
34
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 – Mauritania, http://www.hrw.org/
reports/1992/WR92/AFW-05.htm#P327_1144510 (accessed Mar. 20, 2006) [hereinafter World Report
1992].
35
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 691.
36
Id.
37
Pet.’s Br. 5.
38
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 691; Pet.’s Br. 5.
39
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 691; Pet.’s Br. 5.
40
Id.; Pet.’s Br. 6.
41
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 691; Pet.’s Br. 6.
42
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 691.
30
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appear for an interview, removal proceedings may immediately begin.43
Subsequently, the immigration judge, receiving information from the
asylum interview officer and listening to Diallo’s testimony, but without
making any determinations as to Diallo’s credibility, found that Diallo’s
experiences in Mauritania—his detention, abuse, and expulsion—did not
amount to persecution entitling Diallo to relief from deportation.44 The
immigration judge further found that Diallo had been firmly resettled in
Senegal, was ineligible for asylum, and failed to meet the high burden for
withholding his removal from the United States.45
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) took Diallo’s appeal
and summarily affirmed the findings of the immigration judge.46 The BIA’s
decision hinged on the government’s claim that Diallo was firmly resettled
in Senegal.47 The BIA’s decision was the final step in the administrative
process for Diallo, leaving his only route for review in the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.48
C.

The Decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the prior decisions
of the immigration judge and the BIA.49 First, the court found that the
immigration judge failed to consider whether Diallo had received a vel-non
offer of formal resettlement from the Senegalese government as a factor in
determining whether Diallo was firmly resettled in Senegal.50 An offer of
formal resettlement, or an otherwise firm resettlement, in a third country has
been determined by Congress to be a central factor in determining whether a
party can be granted asylum.51 Since the immigration judge and the BIA did
not consider this factor in making its determination in Diallo’s case, the

_______________________________________________________
43
8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(b) (2005). When a person seeking asylum submits their asylum application with
immigration officials, they are also submitting a “withholding of removal” or deportation form
simultaneously. Participation in the asylum process effectively prevents a premature removal. See id.
44
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 691.
45
Id.
46
Id. Due to a backlog of asylum cases within the immigration courts, the United States Department of
Justice has streamlined appellate procedures, where, according to Marshall Fitz, associate director of
advocacy with the Washington, D.C.-based American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA),
“[w]hat we’re seeing in a typical [asylum] case is that the immigration judge makes an oral decision, the
noncitizen appeals that decision and the BIA invokes the streamlining regulations” affirming the
immigration judge’s decision to the Circuit Court. Richard Acello, Asylum Logjam: Streamlined
Immigration Cases Are Flooding Federal Appeals Courts, 91 ABA J. 18 (Oct. 2005). And Congress has
proposed to consolidate the immigration appeals process further by sending all appeals to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Rachel L. Swarns, In Bills’ Small Print, Critics See a
Threat to Immigration, N.Y. Times (Mar. 25, 2006).
47
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 692.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 690.
50
Id. at 694.
51
Id. at 693; 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (2005); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (West 2005).
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court reversed the decision.52
Second, the court found that the immigration judge and the BIA
failed to determine the credibility of Diallo’s testimony on claims of past
persecution.53 The court noted that credibility determinations made by
immigration judges are granted considerable deference in federal appellate
courts, and a court “must be convinced” that evidence warrants a contrary
conclusion.54 The court found that it was very difficult to ascertain the
immigration judge’s impression of Diallo’s credibility because no such
impression could be gleaned from the record.55 Therefore, the court
remanded the decision to the immigration judge for further consideration of
the credibility of Diallo’s testimony.56
Third, the court found that the immigration judge and the BIA
“failed to support its decision on [Diallo’s] fear of future prosecution with
reasonable or substantial evidence.”57 The court found that the immigration
judge “waffled” on the credibility of Diallo’s testimony; relied on
information provided by the State Department that is prone to bias; and
rather than premising the Diallo’s claim that he was expelled because of his
political opinions, the court assessed Diallo’s claim fearing future
persecution on a discussion of Mauritanians who had been expelled because
of their race and ethnicity.58 Therefore, the court reversed the immigration
judge’s decision and remanded it for further proceedings.59
III.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Firm Resettlement Standard Which the Seventh Circuit
Establishes is Much too Vague and Broad

A person seeking asylum can be barred from receiving asylum if a
court finds that person was firmly resettled in a country other than his home
country prior to fleeing to the United States.60 The doctrine of firm
resettlement has considerable history in immigration law and practice,
having its formal, modern root in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees.61 Since no binding precedent or elaborative authority exists on

_______________________________________________________
52

Diallo, 381 F.3d at 690.
Id.
54
Id. at 698.
55
Id. at 698-99.
56
Id. at 699.
57
Id. at 690.
58
Id. at 700.
59
Id. at 701.
60
8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).
61
The convention states that a person seeking asylum is not a refugee if the person “has acquired a new
nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality . . . .” U. of Minn. Human
Rights Library, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. I § C(3) (Apr. 22, 1954), 189 U.N.T.S.
150, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/v1crs.htm (accessed Mar. 7, 2006).
53
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what constitutes firm resettlement, individual states, through their own
jurisprudence and regulatory powers, have created their own standards
toward determining whether a party was firmly resettled prior to seeking
asylum.62
The United States government has formally integrated the concept
of firm resettlement into its regulatory and legislative immigration regime.
Federal regulations state that persons resettled in another country who seek
asylum in the United States will not be granted asylum.63 A person will be
considered to have been firmly resettled in another country if, “prior to
arrival in the United States, he or she entered into another country with, or
while in that country received, an offer of permanent resident status,
citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.”64 A person can
rebut a court’s firm resettlement finding by asserting that he or she only
stayed in the other country until it was safe to flee, or that even with a
formal offer, the third country severely restricted the person’s personal
rights.65 This mandatory bar to asylum was enacted into the United States
Code by Congress in 1996.66
The exact parameters of what constitutes an offer of permanent
settlement have been the subject of considerable discussion and debate
among the courts. In order to determine whether such an offer has been
made, circuit courts have remanded an asylum decision back to the agency
for further investigation to determine whether, pursuant to the immigration
laws and practice of the country where resettlement is an issue, an offer had
been made to the petitioner seeking asylum.67
When remanding an asylum petition back to the agency, the Third
Circuit established a standard of practice for the government and the asylum
petitioner for determining whether an offer was made.68 The Third Circuit
found that upon remand, the agency carries the initial burden of showing
that an offer was made, and that such an offer can be proven with sufficient

_______________________________________________________
62

See Robert D. Sloane, Article: An Offer of Firm Resettlement, 36 Geo. Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 47 (2004).
Sloane notes that a Canadian court found that rights and obligations constituting firm resettlement
include rights to work and receive social services, whereas United States regulations encourage asylum
officers to consider the totality-of-the-circumstances to ascertain whether the person was firmly resettled
and some courts, like the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Diallo, more squarely focus on a formal
offer of citizenship to constitute firm resettlement.
63
8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).
64
8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2005).
65
The C.F.R. gives two methods of evaluation for rebuttal: 1) entry was a necessary consequence of
flight from persecution, the applicant remained in the third country only until able to resume travel and
established no significant ties to the country; or, 2) the authorities of the country of refuge substantially
and consciously restricted conditions of the applicant’s residence with respect to housing, employment
opportunities, education or travel documentation. Id.
66
8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).
67
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2001).
68
Id.
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evidence that the petitioner for asylum was firmly resettled.69 The petitioner
then has the burden of rebutting the agency’s conclusion, also using
provisions from foreign law to their support.70
In the event that no formal offer was made, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals postulated that a modified “totality-of-the-circumstances” test
should be used by the agency to determine whether the petitioner was firmly
resettled.71 Factors that the agency should consider include the length of the
alien’s stay in a third country, the alien’s intent to remain in the country, and
the extent of the social and economic ties developed by the alien.72 Such
information would be considered as circumstantial evidence of a
government offer of resettlement, or the lack of such an offer.73
The approach adopted by the Third Circuit in Abdille was not new,
but reflected several years of precedent established by other circuit courts.
In the late-1990s, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that when direct
evidence of an offer does not exist, other non-offer factors may be used to
establish a presumption of firm resettlement.74
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Diallo should have
adopted the approach taken by the Third Circuit in Abdille and remanded the
case to the immigration judge for further investigation into whether Diallo
was firmly resettled in Senegal.75 While U.S. immigration regulations
clearly state the primacy of a vel-non offer of citizenship as a clear
indication of whether a petitioner was firmly resettled in another country, if
clear evidence of an offer does not exist, a court’s analysis should not end
there.76 Asylum is a very important and integral right of people seeking

_______________________________________________________
69

Id.
Id.
71
Id. at 486-87.
72
Id. at 487.
73
Id.
74
Cheo v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the petitioners length of stay may create
a rebuttable presumption of firm resettlement); see also Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.
1999).
While the Ninth Circuit has been criticized in the past for its approach to asylum law, Hall notes
that improvements have been made, largely because of communication between the BIA and the Ninth
Circuit. Shelley M. Hall, Quixotic Attempt? The Ninth Circuit, the BIA, and the Search for a Human
Rights Framework to Asylum Law, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 105, 118-27 (Jan. 1998). Hall recommends that
further review of the BIA (made in context of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”)) is important to the successful and equitable development of
asylum law. Id. at 127.
75
The Seventh Circuit could remand the decision in Diallo based on the immigration judge’s failure to
properly determine the petitioner’s credibility, thus constituting either the failure to prove firm
resettlement by substantial evidence or an act that constituted an abuse of discretion, whichever standard
the circuit wishes to apply. Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004).
76
Such a recommendation exists not only to avoid an overbroad standard like the one made in Diallo, but
also from creating a standard that allows fraudulent claims to proceed. See Deborah E. Anker,
Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for Refugees Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 Va. J. Intl.
L. 1, 6-16 (1987) (describing how fraud can occur within the context of an asylum claim).
70
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entry into the United States.77 Considering the sheer volume of people
seeking entry into the United States through conventional immigration
methods, and given the primacy that scholars and legislators give to the
concept of asylum,78 the facts proffered by the petitioner for asylum should
not be taken lightly or glossed over. Here, the Seventh Circuit ignores
Diallo’s length of stay in Senegal, as well as his connections to the
geographic area, in favor of relying on the lack of an offer of permanent
resettlement by the government of Senegal.79 The court clearly had high
goals in mind when it reversed the immigration judge’s findings on firm
resettlement, but adherence to the Third Circuit’s standard would make the
analysis considerably less vague and would provide more comprehensive
procedural guidelines for immigration judges, the BIA, and circuit courts in
the future. If the Seventh Circuit would have adopted the Third Circuit’s
process of analysis in Abdille, Diallo would still have been granted asylum
in the United States, but future courts would have clearer and more specific
guidelines to use in assessing whether a party has not been firmly resettled
in a third country.80
If the Seventh Circuit had adopted the method of the Third Circuit
in Abdille, the result of Diallo’s asylum petition would have been the same.
Such a result would occur because the circumstances upon which Diallo
entered Senegal were unique. Plainly, Diallo contended, and the Seventh
Circuit endorsed the fact, that he was forced to Senegal when his captors
sent him away on a boat with nothing but his Mauritanian identification
card.81 Diallo was essentially deported from his home country to a
neighboring state.
Diallo’s situation is unique, worthy of closer consideration, because
his exile to Senegal took place within the context of an extremely large,
forced displacement movement initiated by the Mauritanian government of
black Moors to Senegal.82 Beginning in the late 1980s, the Mauritanian
government, in a bold disregard for human rights, began forced expulsion of
black Moors from the country.83 As a result, thousands of Mauritanians

_______________________________________________________
77

See Sarah Ignatius, Recent Development: Restricting the Rights of Asylum Seekers: The New
Legislative and Administrative Proposals, 7 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 225, 228-29 (1994).
78
See supra n. 61, at art. I § C(3).
79
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 690.
80
Commentators noted the sweeping effect Diallo would have on asylum law because of the Seventh
Circuit’s reliance on such scant evidence when finding no firm resettlement occurred. See Ron
Browning, Refugee may seek asylum: 7th Circuit Issues First Firm Resettlement Decision Since 1954,
Ind. Law. 3 (Oct. 16, 2004); see also David Ziemer, Firm resettlement requires more than passage of
time, Wis. L. J. (Sept. 1, 2004).
For a particularly harsh assessment of the Seventh Circuit’s decision, see Patricia Manson, 7th
Circuit Tackles ‘novel’ issue of whether alien resettled elsewhere, Chi. Daily L. Bull. 1 (Aug. 27, 2004).
81
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 691.
82
See World Report 1992, supra n. 34.
83
Id.
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were placed into refugee camps in Senegal.84 The United Nations High
Commission on Refugees got involved, brokering a settlement between the
governments so as to allow the refugees the option of returning to
Mauritania upon a guarantee that they would not be oppressed by the
Mauritanian government.85
In this context, it is difficult to place the rigid offer of formal
settlement upon a person like Mamadou Diallo.86 The precarious situation
between Mauritania and Senegal may have created a situation where the
Senegalese government tacitly accepted the existence of displaced
Mauritanians because of the political situation in Mauritania. Furthermore,
since developing countries like Senegal lack the physical and administrative
infrastructure of the United States, it would have been logistically and
financially difficult for the Senegalese government to document the
Mauritanian immigrants when they entered Senegal. And just because an
offer of formal resettlement was not extended to Diallo by the Senegalese
government, it may have been extended if Diallo had inquired to
government officials. The court cites the lack of any meaningful life
experiences for Diallo in Senegal as support for their conclusion that he was
not firmly resettled.87 However, without acknowledgment of the unique
social and political circumstances that Diallo was a part of, the Seventh
Circuit may have set a standard so vague and broad for rebutting a claim of
firm resettlement that anyone, absent receiving an offer of formal citizenship
from a country, would be able to receive entry to the United States on the
basis of asylum.
While asylum cases are to be decided on a case-by-case basis,
criticism questioning the standards courts use to ascertain whether an
asylum claim is validly substantiated exists.88 Especially in consideration of
what constitutes an offer of firm resettlement, as has been demonstrated in
this section, courts are not uniform in their approach of whether an offer

_______________________________________________________
84

Id.
See infra n. 127 and accompanying text.
As the Seventh Circuit notes, Diallo’s capture was several years after the forced deportation and torture
campaign of the Mauritanian government. There is an issue whether the passage of time would make
Diallo subject to the changed conditions presumption used by so many courts. See infra, n. 127 and
accompanying text.
87
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 694-95.
88
See Kathryn A. Dittrick Heebner, Protecting the Truly Persecuted: Restructuring the Flawed Asylum
System, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 549 (2005). In this comment, Dittrick Heebner argues that the current asylum
system is flawed because even though the burden of proof for petitioners of asylum is low, the significant
amount of discretion allotted immigration judges, discretion that is executed unevenly, makes the
administrative procedure for asylum petitions unfair and inefficient. Id.
Commentators have also criticized that the United States Supreme Court, when hearing an
appeal of an asylum case (where the petitioner usually prevailed in the circuit court), is often likely to
find in favor of the government. See Michael G. Heyman, Immigration Law in the Supreme Court: The
Flagging Spirit of the Law, 28 J. Legis. 113, 144-46 (2002).
85
86
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exists.89 Courts should not totally disregard the surrounding political and
social circumstances, as they may be very relevant in determining whether a
party was actually firmly resettled. The Seventh Circuit should have
acknowledged the greater social and factual circumstances surrounding
Diallo’s stay in Senegal. Not necessarily because further analysis would
have led to a different conclusion as to whether Diallo was firmly resettled
in Senegal, but because further analysis would guide future judges to
comprehend the big picture when looking at whether a petitioner is justified
to receive asylum when no vel-non offer of resettlement has been extended
to the petitioner by the country.
Consideration of the surrounding circumstances in absence of a velnon offer not only is relevant for courts in ascertaining whether the
petitioner is firmly resettled, but also is helpful for determining more
accurate and precise judgments. Many cases where firm resettlement is an
issue take place in areas of the world where there is considerable political,
social, and economic instability.90 The highly-formal and administrative
immigration process in the United States makes it relatively simple for
judges in determining whether the United States government has made an
offer of formal resettlement to immigrants; but judges should not rest on the
American immigration model when looking at whether less wealthy and
stable countries have made an offer of formal resettlement to immigrants.
Borders are amazingly porous throughout much of the developing world,
making it frighteningly simple to enter another country without being
noticed by government or immigration officials.91
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit should have remanded Diallo’s case
to the immigration judge on the issue of whether Diallo was firmly resettled
because not enough facts existed to effectively conclude that Diallo was not
firmly resettled. The court’s failure to consider the big picture when looking

_______________________________________________________
89

Sloane, supra n. 62.
Asylum is logically sought by a person who has borne the brunt of considerable social and political
strife in an unstable part of the world. Most petitioners for asylum are victims of political instability. The
Seventh Circuit should have taken such circumstances into account and remanded the case for further
proceedings on the issue of whether Diallo was firmly resettled. Many other circuits consider the larger
political situation when assessing whether a petitioner is firmly resettled. Salazar v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d
45 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that a Peruvian national was firmly resettled in Venezuela and received
Venezuelan approval to be in that county when he fled Peru after an extremist group killed his uncle, he
moved to Venezuela, married a woman he met in line at the American embassy, and moved to the United
States); Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that a Azerbaijani citizen was firmly
resettled in Israel because of the Israeli birthright standard, the Israeli government offered benefits);
Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding an Ethiopian national to have firmly resettled in
Germany after fleeing Ethiopia through Sudan, receiving significant benefits from the German
government, and was considered to have firmly resettled even though she was subject to racial taunting
and threats from German citizens).
91
Furthermore, such an argument is further supported by the fact that even the borders of the United
States are considerably porous as well, as the problem with illegal immigration from the U.S.-Mexico
border has shown.
90
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at Diallo’s case creates a standard for considering firm resettlement that is
much too vague and broad.
B.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Properly Remanded
Because There Was a Credible Issue as to Whether Diallo
Had a Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution in
Mauritania.

1.

What is Persecution Under U.S. Immigration Law?

Finding that a petitioner for asylum either experienced persecution
in the past or has a legitimate fear of future persecution is a difficult
determination to make because persecution has no formal, concise definition
under immigration regulations. Even the United Nations High Commission
on Refugees (“UNHCR”), the organization that determines the international
standard on the fair treatment of refugees, struggles to discretely define
persecution.92
Since no definition of persecution exists in federal
regulations either, asylum cases truly end up being fact-intensive analyses.
The BIA and circuit courts have found that persecution exists in
many different factual circumstances, yet years of agency practice has not
produced a bright line rule. Persecution has been generally defined by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals as “punishment or the infliction of harm
for political, religious, or other reasons that this country does not recognize
as legitimate.”93 Courts should measure contentions of the petitioner
objectively, without placing very much weight on the alleged motivation
and intent of the supposed persecutors.94 Persecution may exist when a
petitioner has been raped or sexually assaulted,95 has been abused or beaten
due to their political opinions,96 intimidated by government officials,97
detained against their will by government officials,98 or has been assaulted
and accosted by members of the military.99 However, the occurrence of
violence against the petitioner is often not enough to establish a claim that

_______________________________________________________
92

Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees ¶¶ 51-53 (UNHCR, ed. 1992). While the Handbook
states that there is no universal definition of persecution, it can be inferred that “a threat to life or
freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social
group” is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights—for the same reasons—would
also constitute persecution. However, the Handbook articulates that signatories to the Convention are
generally able to determine themselves whether a petitioner has been persecuted based on case-by-case
factual analysis.
93
Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995).
94
Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997).
95
Kebede v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2004); Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1996).
96
Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2004); Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 832 F.Supp. 1219 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
97
Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004).
98
Ndom v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2004); Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799 (9th Cir. 2004).
99
Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2004); Ashcroft, 366 F.3d at 808; Begzatowski v. INS,
278 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2002).
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persecution exists.100
A petitioner’s allegation that removal back to their home country is
accompanied by a legitimate and reasonable fear of persecution by officials
is not enough for courts, even when a court could find that past persecution
existed. In such instances, courts look at the totality of the circumstances of
the petitioner’s allegations.101 Considerations include: a comparison of the
conditions in the country at the time when the alleged persecution occurred
and the time at which the asylum proceedings take place, the petitioner’s
credibility, and any other factors the immigration judge determines.102
2.

Past Persecution as a Foundation for Substantiating a Claim
for Asylum

A successful petition for asylum can be based upon the petitioner’s
presentation of evidence and steadfast contention that his/her entry into the
United States was out of fear of past persecution.103 Past persecution validly
occurs on account of the petitioner’s “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .”104 Even
if a party can show that past persecution exists, changed conditions in the
home country will rebut that claim.105 The validity of the petitioner’s claim
of past persecution is determined by the immigration judge, who assesses
the petitioner’s credibility.106 Here, the immigration judge failed to make a
credibility determination of Diallo’s testimony, so the Seventh Circuit was
correct in remanding the case for further proceedings on the issue.107
3.

Fear of Future Persecution as the Foundation for
Substantiating an Asylum Claim

When a petitioner for asylum has successfully established a claim of
asylum based on a fear of past persecution, the court presumes that the
petitioner also has a well-founded fear of future persecution if forced to
return to his/her home country.108 The immigration judge may grant asylum

_______________________________________________________
100
Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that petitioner’s alleged unjustified
detention for three days by police was not enough to show persecution); Ciorba v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 539
(7th Cir. 2003) (finding that petitioner’s alleged claims of police intimidation did not rise to persecution);
Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2nd Cir. 1999) (finding that petitioner’s alleged rape by
Salvadorean soldiers did not rise to persecution); Bhatt v. Reno, 172 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
that petitioner’s claim of oppression based on political opinions did not rise to persecution).
101
See generally Regina Germain, AILA’s Asylum Primer: A Practical Guide to U.S. Asylum Law and
Procedure, §§ 4.5.1 - 4.5.3, 27-32 (3d ed., Am. Immig. Laws. Assn. (“AILA”) 2003).
102
Id.
103
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2005).
104
Id.
105
Id. at (b)(1)(A)-(B).
106
Id.
107
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 690.
108
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). This rule carries an assumption that the source of past persecution and the
well-founded fear of future persecution are essentially the same. See In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312
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to a person who can demonstrate at least a reasonable possibility that he will
be persecuted if forced to return to his country of origin.109 However, the
presumption in favor of the petitioner can be rebutted if a fundamental
change in circumstances has occurred in the home country, thus allaying
fears of future persecution, or if the petitioner could avoid persecution by
moving to a part of the country away from his/her persecutors.110
Furthermore, courts have found that a petitioner’s well-founded fear
of future persecution has both subjective and objective components. First,
the petitioner must show that his fear of future persecution is subjectively
genuine.111 Second, the petitioner must show that his fear is justified by
objective evidence.112 Petitioner must present evidence proving that the
conditions in his home country justify his fear of persecution.113 The judge
must ascertain what level of credibility to attach to the evidence petitioner
presents in support of his claim of persecution.114 In Diallo, since the
immigration judge failed to make a determination as to Diallo’s credibility,
the Seventh Circuit was correct in remanding the case for further
proceedings to determine the credibility of Diallo’s testimony. While the
use of State Department Country Reports by immigration courts to support a
contention that conditions in petitioner’s home country have fundamentally
changed are relevant to the immigration judge’s determination, the
immigration judge should consider an array of secondary sources when
considering a country’s conditions.
In Diallo, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the
persuasiveness, validity, and even the accuracy of the U.S. State
Department’s Asylum and Country Reports.115 The court noted that the
reports had a “potential of bias” and that applicants for asylum have
difficulty rebutting the Department’s conclusions because of a general lack
of resources.116 While the court is right to question the validity of these
reports, the dearth of evidence contradicting the State Department’s
conclusion about human rights conditions in Mauritania, combined with the
fact that the only contrary evidence comes from Diallo’s own testimony is
too narrow a basis for future courts to rely on in ascertaining whether
conditions have fundamentally changed in the country upon which an

(Dept. of Just. 1998); see also Susannah C. Vance, An Enduring Fear: Recent Limitations on the Past
Persecution Ground For Asylum, 91 Ky. L.J. 947, 979-80 (2002-2003).
109
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1987).
110
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B); Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2003).
111
Bhatt, 172 F.3d at 981.
112
Id.
113
8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2005).
114
Id.
115
381 F.3d at 700.
116
Id.
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applicant for asylum is a citizen.117
This is not to say that the State Department’s Asylum and Country
Reports are not persuasive resources; to the contrary, they provide valuable
insight on how the Executive Branch of the United States Government
interacts with countries around the world and how it views the political
situations of other countries.118 Courts should be wary to usurp the
conclusions of the Executive Branch, as agencies like the State Department
are uniquely trained to assess the livability and human rights conditions of
countries around the world.119
An analysis of State Department Reports on Mauritania’s Human
Rights Practices holds up to scrutiny and criticisms of alleged bias. The
1999–2004 reports show that the State Department has harshly noted and
criticized the Mauritanian government for past and current abuses of human
rights.120 Furthermore, the reports are highly detailed and maintain a
sufficient level of objective analysis of the conditions within Mauritania that
it would be proper for a reasonable trier-of-fact to use the reports as
evidence of changed conditions. Regardless of the reliability of the reports,
however, commentators argue that immigration judges and the BIA may
place too much emphasis on the reports to show that conditions in the
petitioner’s home country have changed to rebut a petitioner’s claim of fear
of future persecution.121 Immigration judges may rely too heavily on State
Department reports because with asylum-seekers arriving from many

_______________________________________________________
117
Margulies postulates that the expansion of the changed conditions rebuttal to an asylum claim will
unjustifiably lead to the demise of the protection of refugees who seek asylum in the United States. Peter
Margulies, Democratic Transitions and the Future of Asylum Law, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 3, 4 (2000)
(citing Deborah Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States (5th ed. 1999)); Guy Goodwin-Gill, The
Refugee in International Law 84-87 (1996). Margulies contends that courts’ misinterpretation of the
influence of changed conditions in the home country creates a formalistic doctrine upon which otherwise
valid asylum claims are unnecessarily denied. Margulies, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 17-35.
118
Historically, executive branch documents, specifically those in relation to immigration law and
practice, have been questioned for a continuing “palpable lack of respect for the political values
underlying the human rights protections for refugees . . . .” Carolyn Patty Blum, A Question of Values:
Continuing Divergences Between U.S. and International Refugee Norms, 15 Berkeley J. Intl. L. 38, 50
(1997). While such an accusation raises a legitimate question of whether executive branch documents
can exist as rational, persuasive authority for judicial bodies, such an assessment must be made on a caseby-case basis; no presumption of invalidity should exist.
119
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has been critical of the State department reports in the past. See
Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2004).
120
“The Government’s human rights record remained [generally] poor”; there was some improvement in
a few areas, but problems remain in others. U.S. Dept. of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Lab., U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Mauritania - 1999 1
(U.S. Dept. of State 1999). The State Department continued to criticize the human rights practices of the
Mauritanian government in the reports for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004.
121
Vincente A. Tome, Administrative Notice of Changed Country Conditions in Asylum Adjudication, 27
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 411 (1994). Tome argues that the BIA should at least provide a procedural
guideline for asylum petitioners on the weight given to Executive Branch documents that provide insight
from the federal government on whether conditions in the petitioner’s home country have changed to
rebut a claim of asylum. See also Margulies, supra, n. 117.
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obscure parts of the world, there simply are not many secondary sources
judges can use to make a determination of changed conditions. In addition,
the State Department reports may also allow judges to show that conditions
in the country have fundamentally changed without ever concluding on the
credibility of the petitioner’s testimony.122 Overall, however, a general
reliance on executive branch sources is proper because they exist as
persuasive examples of U.S. government policy towards the home country.
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit was correct to acknowledge that
immigration judges should not place too much weight on Country
Reports.123 The Seventh Circuit should have gone a step further,
encouraging immigration judges and the BIA to use other secondary sources
as evidence of assessing a country’s condition to provide a comprehensive
and full analysis of human rights conditions. Many secondary sources exist
on human rights abuses in Mauritania and an assessment of them shows that
they are in general agreement with the conclusions and factual findings of
the State Department documents.124 Secondary sources should be relevant
to any agency’s assessment and have even been used by petitioner’s counsel
to substantiate an asylum claim.125
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has routinely relied on State
Department Country Reports for Mauritania when assessing whether
changed conditions exist to rebut an asylum petition.126 Many of the asylum

_______________________________________________________
122

Indeed, the almost boilerplate reliance that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals places on the Country
Reports raises a legitimate question as to whether the credibility of petitioners’ testimony is truly being
considered. See also Diallo v. Gonzales, 140 Fed. Appx. 612 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
123
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 700.
124
Extensive state-sponsored human rights abuses have occurred in Mauritania of late, including forcible
expulsions of minority ethnic groups, land expropriation of minority ethnic groups, particularly Black
Moors, particularly horrendous allegations of slavery, and other forms of discrimination. Human Rights
Watch/Africa, Mauritania’s Campaign of Terror: State-Sponsored Repression of Black Africans (Human
Rights Watch 1994) [hereinafter Mauritania’s Campaign of Terror]. Many important resistance leaders
were arrested and disappeared, including many members of FLAM, the group that Diallo’s brother was
very involved with. Id. Further accounts of slavery in Mauritania have been substantiated in other
sources, which have on occasion been used by counsel for petitioners to help solidify an asylum claim.
See Diallo, 140 Fed. Appx. at 612.
It is also important to note that Mauritania’s spotty human rights record remains controversial.
See Jason Motlagh, Protesters blast Arab rule in Mauritania, United Press Intl (UPI) (Apr. 5, 2005); see
also Sherri Williams, Asylum-Seekers May Face Tougher Challenge, Columbus Dispatch 10A (Apr.10,
2005).
125
And a petitioner’s use of secondary sources to substantiate a claim that asylum is warranted does not
always succeed. See Diallo, 140 Fed. Appx. 612; Sarr v. Gonzales, 127 Fed. Appx. 815 (6th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished) (finding that the petitioner’s proffered evidence of the book Silent Terror, documenting
slavery in Mauritania, did not effectively rebut changed country conditions); see also Samuel Cotton,
Silent Terror: A Journey into Contemporary African Slavery (Writers & Readers Publg. 1999).
In Niang v. INS, petitioner proffered testimony from a professor of African studies to support
their claim of fear of future persecution, however unsuccessfully, because of the presumptive force
ascribed by the Sixth Circuit to the State Department Country Reports. 106 Fed. Appx. 970, 972 (6th
Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
126
See Diallo, 140 Fed. Appx. at 615-16.
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cases brought before the Sixth Circuit use the Country Reports as an
effective rebuttal to claims of Mauritanian nationals who alleged persecution
from a state-sponsored act that occurred between 1989–1991.127 The Sixth
Circuit precedent, while illustrative of a cohesive and comprehensive
approach of deference to agency and executive branch authority, is not
directly helpful to Diallo. However, it provides a persuasive guideline on
the weight to attach to such documents in relation to the use of other
secondary sources.
Since the majority of these fact-finding determinations are to be
conducted by immigration law judges, the Seventh Circuit was correct in
remanding Diallo for further consideration.128 The court’s questioning of
the State Department Country Report for Mauritania was not particularly
helpful to immigration judges because the Sixth Circuit has given
considerable weight to the information within those reports.129 As this
section indicates, the court would have been wise to instruct immigration
judges to allow the use of a wide variety of sources in their consideration of
asylum claims, so as to avoid any potential bias that may exist in Executive
Branch documents. While all information in this case suggests that bias
probably does not exist, for future precedent, the court would have been
wise to mplement such a standard to prevent even the remote possibility of
bias. A Credibility Determination is necessary to determine whether a
petitioner has sufficiently shown that he has not been firmly resettled in a
third country. The Seventh Circuit, by failing to conduct or allow a
Credibility Determination of Mr. Diallo’s resettlement in Senegal, has
usurped the ability of immigration courts to conduct such determinations.
A petitioner’s credibility is initially determined at the asylum
interview conducted by the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”).130 At the interview, the applicant has the opportunity to present
witnesses and affidavits to support his claim.131 The asylum officer is

_______________________________________________________
127
The Country Reports indicated that a majority of those forcibly deported by the Mauritanian
government between 1989-1991 have “successfully returned to Mauritania.” Id. Reason for their return
is the involvement of the UNHCR in brokering an agreement with the Mauritanian and Senegalese
government. Id. Such evidence was found to rebut fear of persecution upon return to Mauritania
because the conditions in the country had changed. Id.; see also Sall v. Gonzales, 124 Fed. Appx. 377
(6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); Diack v. Ashcroft, 110 Fed. Appx. 648 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished);
Kalidou v. Ashcroft, 108 Fed. Appx. 381(6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Aw v. INS, 107 Fed. Appx. 585
(6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Diaw v. Ashcroft, 108 Fed. Appx. 318 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished);
Guisse v. INS, 107 Fed. Appx. 564 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Mbaye v. INS, 106 Fed. Appx. 371 (6th
Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
128
Diallo, 381 F.3d at 701.
129
See supra, n. 127 and accompanying text.
130
The EOIR is a division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and is generally responsible for the
oversight and adjudication of immigration cases. Courts under the auspices of the EOIR include the
individual immigration judges and the BIA.
131
8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2005).
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charged to consider all the information presented and assess whether the
applicant has demonstrated a viable claim of asylum. If the asylum officer
finds that the applicant has met his burden of proof, then asylum is
granted.132 However, the asylum officer also has the discretion to deny the
application for asylum, as the asylum officer found in Diallo.133 In the
denial, the asylum officer must present an assessment of the credibility of
the petitioner’s testimony and representations.134 When the asylum officer
denies the petitioner’s request for asylum, the officer must also
automatically refer the applicant’s request to the immigration judge for
further adjudication.135
A petitioner’s testimony is credible if it is sufficient to sustain a
burden of proof “in light of general conditions in the applicant’s country of
nationality” or, if stateless, “last habitual residence.”136 The immigration
judge has responsibility for making a credibility determination, and the
judge’s conclusion is given Chevron-like deference by the BIA and circuit
courts.137 Credibility findings are important because they weigh heavily on
whether a petitioner’s application for asylum will succeed. So the failure of
an immigration judge to make such a determination is grounds for remand.
In Diallo, the immigration judge failed to make a credibility determination
on Diallo’s testimony.138 Since a credibility determination would affect all
material parts of Diallo’s application for asylum, as well as the validity of
any defenses and contentions raised by the government, it would behoove
the Seventh Circuit not to remand Diallo’s entire application, including the
portions regarding firm resettlement, back to the immigration judge for
further proceedings. Such a result would be appropriate as it would provide
Diallo with adequate due process standards in administrative procedures.
The failure of Mr. Diallo’s interpreter to appear before the asylum officer at
his interview should not constitute a failure to appear under immigration law
because it resulted due to no fault of Mr. Diallo; courts acknowledge a due
process right for petitioners who need an interpreter; and the failure of the
interpreter to appear could be construed as Mr. Diallo being subjected to an
incompetent interpreter.
The right to an interpreter at an asylum hearing is a right incumbent

_______________________________________________________
132

8 C.F.R. § 208.14(e).
8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 691.
134
Germain, supra n. 101, at § 2.5.6, 109.
135
8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c).
136
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
137
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 468 U.S. at 1227 (finding that a court should not overturn an agency’s
interpretation of a statute unless it is contrary to clear congressional intent).
Some commentators argue that the deferential standard established in Chevron should not be
controlling, and courts should take a “hard look” at an agency’s asylum decisions. See Kevin R.
Johnson, A “Hard Look” at the Executive Branch’s Asylum Decisions, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 279 (1991).
138
381 F.3d at 691.
133

Published by eCommons, 2005

524

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

to receiving a full and fair hearing as part of an administrative adjudicative
proceeding. Under current immigration law precedent, if a petitioner is
provided with an interpreter that does not speak his native language, the
petitioner’s right to a full and fair hearing will be deemed as having been
violated.139 Such a violation of a petitioner’s due process rights should
extend to situations where, like in Diallo, due to no fault of the petitioner,
the interpreter fails to show up. A petitioner for asylum should not be
penalized by being classified as having “failed to appear” because such a
determination could cast a negative shadow on the ultimate outcome of the
petitioner’s case. Therefore, Mr. Diallo’s due process rights were violated
when the immigration judge found that he failed to appear for his asylum
interview when his interpreter failed to show up.
The United States Supreme Court has found that non-citizens
entering the United States, whether lawfully or unlawfully, are entitled to
protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution when subject to procedures of administrative
agencies.140 Circuit courts have upheld the due process rights of asylum
applicants, finding various circumstances where administrative agencies had
improperly denied process to asylum applicants. Such instances include:
where documents provided by a government agency were speculative and
unfairly used against the applicant,141 where the applicant had insufficient
time to prepare arguments showing valid fears of future persecution,142
where the applicant was a stowaway and was denied an asylum hearing,143
and where the asylum officer failed to allow the applicant to support his
contention of presenting credible testimony.144
Courts have previously recognized that an asylum petitioner’s due
process right to a full and fair hearing has been violated when the
petitioner’s interpreter did not speak the petitioner’s native dialect.145 In
Amadou, a Mauritanian citizen seeking asylum in the United States had an
interpreter who failed to speak the applicant’s native dialect.146 The failure

_______________________________________________________
139

Amadou v. INS, 226 F.3d 724, 725 (6th Cir. 2000).
U.S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954).
141
Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 116, 128 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding reliance on State Department letter
which contained multiple hearsay of the most troubling kind violated the applicant’s due process rights).
142
Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the last minute designation of
Armenia as a country of deportation deprived applicant of the opportunity to prepare and present relevant
arguments and evidence regarding the harm he would suffer in Armenia).
143
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of the interpreter to properly translate the asylum officer’s questions and the
petitioner’s answers resulted in miscommunications, leading to the denial of
the petitioner’s asylum request.147 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the petitioner successfully argued that the interpreter’s failure to
translate his statements and the asylum officer’s questions constituted a
violation of the petitioner’s due process rights.148 Furthermore, the court
noted that the petitioner was prejudiced by the interpreter’s error-ridden
translation as both the immigration judge and the BIA relied on the
petitioner’s testimony in denying his request for asylum, and that the
petitioner’s testimony played an important role in the immigration judge’s
credibility determination.149
The failure of an interpreter to appear, where the failure of the
interpreter to appear has occurred due to no fault of the petitioner, should
not detrimentally affect the petitioner’s ability to receive asylum. It is
sometimes difficult to obtain an interpreter for asylum petitioners because of
the primitive nature of the petitioners’ language. This is especially
problematic for petitioners of asylum because if their inability to obtain an
interpreter eventually leads to an unsuccessful petition for asylum, then they
will be removed to their home country (where they were previously
subjected to persecution) due to what is essentially a procedural error. Such
a result is not consistent with the words, spirit, and purpose of either the
CAT or U.S. immigration regulations. Therefore, courts should extend
guaranteed due process rights to petitioners for asylum whose interpreters
fail to appear due to no fault of the petitioner.
Under current immigration law, the petitioner’s failure to appear
“may result in the dismissal of the asylum application or the waiver of the
right to an interview.”150 A failure to appear may result if, without good
cause shown, the applicant fails to procure an interpreter that can translate
both the applicant’s language and English.151 The petitioner’s failure to
appear will expedite removal back to the petitioner’s home country, with the
application being referred to an immigration judge for adjudication.152
When an interpreter fails to appear, due to no fault of the petitioner
for asylum, the immigration judge should not categorize such circumstances
as a “failure to appear.” There are several reasons for this: first, assuming
that the petitioner has a valid case for asylum, saying that he “failed to

_______________________________________________________
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appear” makes his case much more difficult to prove.153 Second, asylum is
something that the federal government does not discourage.154 Third, it
makes more sense administratively for judges to grant deference and allow
petitioners the requisite due process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit may have been correct in finding that Diallo
was not firmly resettled in Senegal. Asylum is meant for people just like
Diallo, who have been persecuted in the past because of their alleged
political beliefs and/or their ethnicity. However, the issue of free riders is a
persistent problem in the judicial system.155 If courts allow asylum based on
the broad and vague standards established by the Seventh Circuit in Diallo,
a significant risk exists that many fraudulent claims could move through the
system merely because no vel-non offer of resettlement was made to the
petitioner. To avoid such a circumstance, circuit courts should impose
clearer and more comprehensive guidelines on immigration courts so as to
improve the probability that only legitimate claims filter through the system.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit should have considered the totality of the
circumstances in ascertaining whether Diallo was firmly resettled. The
court should have remanded on the issue because not enough facts existed
on the topic. The court should have created a guideline on what sources can
be considered in determining whether changed conditions exist in the home
country. Finally, the court should have acknowledged that Diallo’s due
process rights were violated when he was deemed to have failed to appear
when his interpreter did not show up at his asylum interview. While the
administrative process is a creature of the Executive Branch, the Judicial
Branch informs the process greatly through their precedence and reasoning.
The Seventh Circuit should have better informed the immigration courts on
the process to create a more efficient and fair asylum system.

_______________________________________________________
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